This paper examines the relative importance of the stock return's stock-specific component versus its common-factor component in explaining the momentum profits. Using a model nesting both Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Grundy and Martin (2001), we demonstrate that the Fama-French three-factors model leaves out important predictive variations in stock returns needed for Chordia and Shivakumar's results. In the context of a linear asset pricing model with any choice of factors, we show that the predictive intercept and hence the predicted returns contain both a stock-specific component and a common-factor component. We propose a method, which is free from the missing-factor problem in specifying the asset pricing model, to extract the stock-specific component from the predictive intercept and find that a momentum strategy based solely on this component generates significant profits. For robustness, we consider the Fama-French three-factors model with time-varying betas and its extended four-factors model with Pastor and Stambaugh's (2003) liquidity factor as the fourth factor. The stock-specific component, if not the only source, appears to be a very important source of momentum profits. In various models and setups it always generates significant momentum profits in magnitude of over one half of the momentum profits in stock returns. We also explore various horizons for portfolio formation and get similar results on the significance of momentum profits based on rankings of this stock-specific component.
Introduction
The profitability of the momentum strategy -the strategy of buying recent winning stocks and shorting recent losing stocks -as first documented in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) remains one of the anomalies that cannot be explained by the otherwise very successful Fama-French three-factors model, and is thus very puzzling (Fama and French, 1996) . Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) show that momentum profits remain large even subsequent to the period of their 1993 study. Rouwenhorst (1998) and Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) report economically significant and statistically reliable momentum profits in areas outside the US. All these studies suggest that the momentum phenomenon is not a product of data mining or data snooping bias.
Although the momentum phenomenon has been well accepted, the source of the profits and the interpretation of the evidence are widely debated. A variety of papers ranging from behavior models to rational-expectation models attempt to offer an explanation. For the behavioral arguments, the momentum phenomenon is often interpreted as evidences that investors under-react to new information. Along this line, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) , and Hong and Stein (1999) have developed behavioral models to explain the momentum. The behavioral argument commands support of empirical evidences that momentum profits are related to several characteristics not typically associated with the priced risk in standard asset pricing models.
1 Against the backdrop of the behavioral arguments, others have suggested that the profitability of momentum strategies may simply be compensation for risk. Conrad and Kaul (1998) argue that the momentum profit is attributed to the cross-sectional dispersion in (unconditional) expected returns. Lewellen (2002) finds that the negative cross-serial correlation among stocks, not underreaction, is the main source of momentum profits.
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Using the frequency domain component method to decompose stock returns, Yao (2003) provides strong evidence that momentum is a systematic phenomenon. Theoretic models have been developed to link momentum to economic risk factors affecting investment life cycles and growth rates. Berk, Green and Naik (1999) illustrate that momentum profits arise because of persistent systematic risk in a firm's project portfolios. Johnson (2002) posits that momentum comes from a positive relation between expected returns and firm growth rates.
Overall, the risk-based explanation attributes the source of momentum profits to the common-factor components of stock returns while the behavioral explanation is more likely to attribute the source to the non-factor-related components (or, for simplicity, stock-specific components hereinafter). To gauge the relevance of these two different stories, it is necessary for us to better understand which part is more important in generating the momentum profits. However, two recent papers seem to offer contradictory evidences on the relative importance of these two components.
In this paper we apply a model that nests the two models used in Grundy and Martin (2001) and Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) to U.S. equity markets to answer this question and show how these two different sets of results are reconciled with each other. We first confirm the results of Grundy and Martin and Chordia and Shivakumar using their models, respectively. Similar to Grundy and Martin, we find that the Fama-French three-factors model cannot explain the momentum profits although it can explain most of the winner or loser return variability. And like Chordia and Shivakumar, we find that the momentum profits are mainly driven by the predictive variations in stock returns that are related to the common macroeconomic variables. We then use a model similar to Ferson and Harvey (1999) to reconcile the two seemingly contradictory results. The FamaFrench three-factors model leaves out important predictive variations in stock returns, which explains the co-existence of the two different results. We further impose in Chordia and Shivakumar's (2002) predictive framework cross-sectional restrictions implied by an asset pricing model and illustrate that the stock-specific component generates the major part of the momentum profits. The time-varying risk premium appears to only have very limited power in explaining momentum profits.
In the context of a linear asset pricing model with any choice of factors and by nesting the predictive relation as a reduced form of such model, we show that the predictive intercept and hence the predicted returns contain both a stock-specific component and a commonfactor component that can not be uniquely separated from each other. The momentum profits explained by the predicted returns can come from either component. We then propose a method, free of the missing-factor problem in specifying the asset pricing model, to extract the stock-specific component from the predictive intercept. The momentum strategy based solely on this stock-specific component delivers significant profits that exhibit a striking seasonality and account for more than one half of the total momentum profits in stock returns. Although Ferson and Harvey (1991) demonstrate that the time-varying risk premiums are mainly responsible for the return predictability that seems to be able to explain the momentum profits, we find that the bulk of the predictive variations needed to generate momentum profits actually appear to be driven by the stock-specific component. Interestingly, Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003) use a predictive regression framework similar to Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) to study the sources of momentum profits in international equity markets and they report that momentum profits are more related to the stock-specific (or country-specific, in their case) component.
For robustness check, we consider the Fama-French three-factors model with the timevarying betas, its extended four-factors model with Pastor and Stambaugh's (2003) liquidity factor as the fourth factor, and variants of the predictive regression. Overall, our results remain the same: the stock-specific component always generates significant momentum profits while the common-factor component rarely does. Like Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2003) and Griffin, Ji, and Martin (2003), we find that some of Chordia and Shivakumar's (2002) results are not robust to the one-month skipping commonly employed to take account of microstructure concerns. We also explore various horizons for portfolio formation and get similar results on the significance of momentum profits based on rankings of the stock-specific component.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 features the models used to identify the sources of momentum profits; Section 3 describes the data and presents momentum profits in stock returns; Section 4 analyzes the empirical evidences on the sources of momentum profits; Section 5 discusses the robustness analysis; and Section 6 concludes.
Model

Theory
Consider the following linear asset pricing model 3 r it = E(r it |Z t−1 ) + β i {F t − E(F t |Z t−1 )} + ε it ,
with
and λ kt (Z t−1 ) = E(F kt |Z t−1 ).
Here r it stands for stock i's returns in excess of one-month Treasury Bill rates, Z t−1 is the vector of common information variables at t−1, which we assume to include market dividend yield DIV t−1 , short-term interest rate Y LD t−1 , term spread T ERM t−1 , and default spread DEF t−1 , the coefficient vectors β i are the conditional betas of the return r i on the factors F t , λ kt is the risk-premium on factor k, and α i is a stock-specific return component not related to any systematic risks. Equation (1) identifies a stock's systematic risk (β i ) through a linear regression of the unexpected stock returns on the unanticipated parts of the risk factors. Equation (2) links the stock's expected returns to these systematic risks and their associated risk premiums as well as to the possible reward from stock-specific risks. Note in theory an asset pricing model implies that α i equals zero (i.e., nonsystematic risk should not be rewarded). However this may not be always true in the data and therefore we include a stock-specific component in the expected returns. The factor risk premium is assumed to be time-varying and modeled through a linear function of Z t−1 as in Ferson and Harvey (1991) among others:
λ kt = a k0 + a k Z t−1 = a k0 + a k1 DIV t−1 + a k2 Y LD t−1 + a k3 T ERM t−1 + a k4 DEF t−1
Combining equations (1), (2) and (4) gives the following predictive regression as in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) :
Note that δ ij are cross-sectionally restricted through δ ij = k β ik a kj , j = 1, 2, 3, 4, and β ik are not identified in this predictive regression. Equation (5) can be regarded as the reduced form of the linear asset pricing model characterized by equation (1), equation (2) and equation (4) .
For each month t, the above model is typically estimated with a history of 60-month data (the estimation period), say t − 61 to t − 2. The estimated parameters can then be used to compute the expected/predicted returns in the portfolio formation period, say t − 7 to t − 2. Based on its expected/predicted return over the formation period, a stock is then sorted into one of the 10 decile portfolios. Profits from the momentum strategy based on ranking of the predicted returns are defined as the profits of longing the top decile portfolio and shorting the bottom decile portfolio. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) use equation (5), i.e., the reduced-form linear asset pricing model, to study the relative importance of common factors and stock-specific information as sources of momentum profits. They find that the momentum strategy based on rankings of the predicted returns generates significant profits while the momentum strategy based on rankings of the unexplained part does not generate significant profits at all. They claim that the momentum profits based on rankings of past returns are attributable to cross-sectional differences in the conditionally expected returns that are explained/predicted by common macroeconomic variables. However, the predictive regression in equation (5) shows that the intercept c i actually contains two components: the stock-specific component α i and one piece of the common factor component (i.e., the risk premium implied by the factor model) k β ik a k0 . Thus the predicted returns c i + δ i z t−1 contain both a stock-specific component α i and a common-factor component k β ik a k0 + δ i z t−1 . A stock can be sorted into the top decile portfolio because of either a high α i or a high k β ik a k0 (or k β ik a k0 + δ i z t−1 ). Accordingly a trading strategy based on the ranking of predicted returns c i + δ i z t−1 as in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) is unable to uniquely identify the sources of momentum profits.
To extract the stock-specific component from the predictive relationship, we decompose the model estimation period into two subperiods: the in-formation period during which individual stocks are ranked and momentum portfolios are formed; and the out-of-formation period. We assume that the systematic risks of stock i, β i , do not change from the out-offormation period to the in-formation period but the stock-specific return component α i , if it exists, may change. 4 We thus have two (potentially) different predictive intercepts between the two subperiods, and we take the difference to obtain:
where α i0 is the in-formation-period stock-specific return and α i1 is the out-of-formationperiod stock-specific return. Unlike c i0 or c i1 , the term c i0 −c i1 only contains the stock-specific information. 5 If only the common-factor component in the predicted returns is responsible for the momentum profits, a strategy based on rankings of c i0 − c i1 would generate NO momentum profits, and the two strategies based on rankings of c i0 + δ i z and c i1 + δ i z would render similar results. On the other hand, if the stock-specific component is also the source, a strategy based on rankings of c i0 − c i1 is expected to generate significant momentum profits. Notice that our above discussions do not rely on the assumption of a particular factor model as the true asset pricing model, though we do need the assumptions of a linear asset pricing model and a linear relationship between the risk premiums and the lagged common macroeconomic variables. Further note that equation (6) is free from the missingfactor problem that may occur in the specification of the linear asset pricing model. If, for example, there is one factor F * missing from the specification and the time-varying risk premium of F * is linearly linked to the instruments via the loadings vector a * , then, denoting the stock loadings on the missing factor by β * , we have
which is the same as equation (6) . 4 Empirical asset pricing models typically assume that loadings on factors are stable within a 60-month estimation horizon (see, e.g., Fama and MacBeth, 1973; and Fama and French, 1992) . Ghysels (1998, p569) argues that betas change through time very slowly. Barun, Nelson and Sunier (1995) provide evidence of very weak time variation in direct estimates of conditional betas with monthly data. If betas only move very slowly, the difference in betas between the in-formation period and the out-of-formation period is likely to be negligible. We relax this assumption and allow for time-varying betas in Section 5.1 and come up with qualitatively very similar results.
5 If the asset pricing model holds, then α i0 =α i1 =0. If the stock-specific return does not change between the two subperiods, then α i0 =α i1 . In either case, c i0 − c i1 =0 and a sorting of stocks based on the c i0 − c i1 term can not generate cross-sectional variations in returns at all.
Models
In light of these discussions, we allow for different intercepts c i between the in-formation period and the out-of-formation period in our specification of the predictive regression [Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) ] and name this as Model A.
where D t = 1 for the in-formation period and D t = 0 for the out-of-formation period. The common factor component is k β ik λ kt (Z t−1 ) = k β ik a k0 + δ i z t−1 and the stock-specific component is α i0 (note that the momentum portfolios are formed based on rankings in the formation period). Since α i0 and k β ik a k0 can not be separately identified from the in-formation-period intercept c i0 , the predicted returns c i0 + δ i z t−1 actually contains both the stock-specific information and the common-factor-related information. As shown in equation (6) , the component c i0 − c i1 in contrast contains only the stock-specific information.
Model B is closely related to equation (8) (or equation (5)). When the time-varying risk premiums are not explicitly modeled and the Fama-French three-factors model is assumed as the true asset pricing model so that β ik can be explicitly modeled, the model used in Grundy and Martin (2001) obtains:
The common-factor component is β i F t and the stock-specific component is α i0 . 6 Unlike Model A, the common-factor component in Model B is defined on the basis of the ex-post factor risk premiums.
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Model C is a generalized version of Model B. We explicitly specify the predicted pattern in r t that may be left unexplained by Model B through the predictable variations in the Fama-French factor risk premiums. This specification follows Ferson and Harvey (1999) in which a similar model is used to show that the Fama-French three-factors model fails in explaining the time-varying pattern in expected returns.
The common-factor component in this model is β i F t while the stock-specific component is α i0 + γ i z t−1 .
8 If the Fama-French model explains the conditional expected returns, the 6 The term α i0 is actually a non-Fama-French-factor-related component. From this point onward, we, as in Grundy and Martin (2001), call it the stock-specific component for brevity. Such convenience is further used in Section 5.2.
7 Strictly speaking, Model B and equation (8) are non-nested. Given equation (3), Model B requires a specific Fama-French factor model but no specifications of the time-varying risk premiums while equation (8) requires a linear specification of the time-varying risk premiums but no specifications of an asset pricing model. See also Footnote 3 for more subtle differences between the two models. 8 For convenience, we abuse the notation α i0 and α i1 in that they stand for the abnormal returns in Model B but have no such asset-pricing implications in Model C.
predictive coefficients γ equal zero (and so do the intercepts α 0 and α 1 ).
Model D is a special case of Model B when the time-varying Fama-French factor risk premiums are explicitly modeled as linear functions of lagged macroeconomic variables. It is also a special case of equation (8) when a particular cross-sectional restriction is imposed, that is, when the Fama-French three-factors model is used as the true asset pricing model.
The first equation allows us to identify β i through the factor model and the second equation models the time-varying risk premiums. The common-factor component is k β ik λ kt (Z t−1 ) = k β ik F kt , where F kt is the fitted F kt from the second equation, and the stock's stock-specific component is then the difference between the return r i and its common-factor component
We use the above four models to decompose stock returns into different parts and study the profitability of momentum strategies based on rankings of each part. This would help us understand the sources of momentum profits in stock returns.
Data and Momentum Payoffs in Stock Returns
Data
The study uses all NYSE/AMEX stocks on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly database from December 1925 through December 2002 (925 months). Fama-French three factors are used in the tests to control for risks in Models B, C and D. They include the return on CRSP value-weighted market index in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate (MKT RF), the small-minus-big size factor (SMB) and the high-minus-low book-to-market-ratio factor (HML) from July 1926 through December 2002 (918 months).
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To capture the time-varying risk premium, we use the following four macroeconomic variables that prior studies have found to predict market returns: the lagged values of the valueweighted market dividend yield, term premium, default premium, and short rate, all from December 1926 through December 2002 (913 months). Fama and French (1989) , among others, show that those variables are related to business conditions. The dividend yield (DIV) is defined as the total dividend payment accrued to the CRSP value-weighted market index over the past 12 months divided by the current price level of the market index. The term premium (TERM) is the yield spread of a ten-year Treasury bond over a three-month Treasury bill, the default premium (DEF) is the yield spread between Moody's Baa and Aaa rated bonds, and the short rate (YLD) is the yield on the three-month Treasury bill. The dividend yield data is calculated using the CRSP data set while the other three macroeconomic variables are obtained from the DRI database. Table 1 summarizes those factors and macroeconomic variables.
Momentum Profits
As favored in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), momentum portfolios are formed based on the past six-month returns and held for the following six months. To minimize the spurious negative autocorrelation due to bid-ask bounces, one month is skipped between the portfolio formation period and the portfolio holding period. Compounded returns are calculated for stocks in the portfolio formation period.
10 Also, only stocks with returns throughout the entire ranking period are eligible for winner/loser selection. Specifically, for each month t, all NYSE/AMEX stocks on the monthly CRSP tape with returns for months t − 7 through t − 2 are ranked into decile portfolios according to their compounded raw returns during that period. Decile portfolios are formed monthly by weighting equally all firms in that decile ranking. Thus, P 1 and P 10 are equal-weighted portfolios of the 10 percent of the stocks with the lowest and highest returns over the pervious six months, respectively. The momentum strategy longs the winner portfolio (P10) and shorts the loser (P1) and holds the position for the following six months (t through t + 5). To increase the power of our tests, we follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to construct overlapping portfolios. Note that with a six-month holding period each month's decile portfolio return is a combination of the past six ranking strategies, and the weights of one-sixth of the stocks change each month with the rest being carried over from the previous month. Each monthly cohort is assigned an equal weight in that decile portfolio. Test statistics are based on the non-overlapping portfolio returns. As a result, the sample for momentum profits covers the period of August Table 2 reports the average monthly holding returns for the ten decile momentum portfolios as well as the momentum profits. Portfolio P1 consists of stocks with the lowest decile ranking period returns and P10 consists of stocks with the highest decile ranking period returns. Portfolio P10-P1 is formed as the momentum strategy of longing past winners and shorting the past losers. Over the full sample period, there is a clearly monotonic relation between returns and momentum ranks, consistent with the results in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001 ). The overall average momentum profit is a significant 0.76%. Like Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) , there is also a strong seasonality in momentum profits: on average, the winners outperform the losers by 1.34% per month in all non-January months, but the losers outperform the winners by a significant 5.67% per month in January. This seasonality is likely driven by the tax-loss selling of losing stocks at calendar year-end, which subsequently rebound in January when the selling pressure is alleviated (Grinblatt and Moskowitz, 2003) . Overall, the momentum strategy generates positive profits in about 67% of the months and in about 71% of the non-January months. Only less than 20% of Januaries in this period witness a positive profit from this momentum strategy, though. Table 2 reveals that, except for the pre-1951 subperiod, the above return patterns exist in all three subsequent subperiods. The momentum profits are insignificantly different from zero during the period 08/1926-12/1950. The overall momentum profits in the three post-1950 subperiods are all significant and greater than the profits from the full sample period. In particular, the subperiod of 01/1965-12/1989 generates the largest momentum profits at 1.15% per month with a t−statistics of 4.25, which is close to the corresponding momentum profits in the original Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) sample period. The momentum profits, though only marginally significant, continue in the more recent 1990 to 2002 period, corroborating the results in Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and offering further evidences on the robustness of the momentum phenomenon.
11 Table 2 illustrates a striking seasonality in momentum profits during all the four subperiods too.
Sources of Momentum Profits
In this section, we use Models A-D to study the sources of momentum profits. This is done through decomposing stock returns into different parts and studying the profitability of momentum strategies according to rankings of each part. Based on how much each part explains the total return momentum profits, we can identify the sources and evaluate their relative importance in generating the momentum profits.
For each month t, each of the four models is estimated for each NYSE/AMEX stock on the monthly CRSP tape using data from t−61 through t−2 (the estimation period). We require a stock to have at least 36 monthly observations within that estimation period to be included in estimation. The estimated model is then used to decompose stock returns in excess of onemonth Treasury Bill rates into various components. Based on each component compounded in the portfolio formation period (months t − 7 to t − 2) the stock is then ranked into one of the ten deciles if it has returns throughout the entire formation period. The momentum strategy based on rankings of that component longs the winner portfolio (P10) and shorts the loser (P1) and holds the position for the following six months (t through t + 5). Again a one-month gap is imposed between the portfolio formation period and the portfolio holding period to reduce the impact of bid-ask bounces. Within each decile portfolio returns are equally-weighted. The sample period for the such-computed momentum profits is 02/1930-12/2002 (875 months). Table 3 through Table 7 , report the results of these four models, respectively. We analyze them in details in the following subsections.
Model
A: Predictive Regression (Chordia and Shivakumar (2002)) Table 3 documents the results of Model A which is close to the predictive regression used in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) . 12 The first row reports the average momentum profits and the associated t−statistics for various periods. For the full sample, the momentum 11 The magnitude and significance level of the momentum profits for the post-1989 period are different between our study and Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). This is partially due to the inclusion in our study of the most recent data of 1999 through 2002 during which a market downturn and one economic recession are overlaid. Exclusion of the four-year period generates results very similar to Jegadeesh and Titman (2001).
12 Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) use the out-of-sample one-period-ahead predictions in their analysis, while we use the in-sample predictions in the analysis of Model A. The analysis based on the out-of-sample prediction is reported in Table 11 .
profit is an average of 0.64%. Similar to Table 2 , the momentum profits are significant for the subperiod 01/1965-12/1989, insignificant for the pre-1965 subperiod, and marginally insignificant for the post-1989 subperiod; The subperiod of 01/1965-12/1989 has the largest momentum profits of 1.05% per month; The momentum phenomenon exhibits seasonality and, in particular, the momentum strategy generates a significant negative payoff in Januaries for all periods.
As in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) , the momentum strategy based on the ranking of the predicted returns c 0 + δ z generates significant payoffs for the full sample and the two post-1964 subperiods. The momentum strategy based on the ranking of unpredicted returns, measured by either the intercept c 0 or the residual ε or the sum of the intercept and the residual c 0 + ε, cannot generate any significant payoffs in any period. These evidences seem to suggest that the stock's predicted component is the source of momentum profits. Notice that if the predicted return is truly the only source of momentum profits, a momentum strategy based on rankings of predicted returns should generate a payoff at least as high as the strategy based on rankings of raw returns that are noisy signals of the predictive returns. Table 3 offers results that are consistent with this intuition. Specifically, the predicted-returnbased momentum payoffs are 0.78%, 1.00% and 0.94% for the 02/1930-12/2002 period, the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod and the 01/1990-12/2002 subperiod, respectively, and all are significant. They are higher than or close to the raw-return-based momentum payoffs in the corresponding periods. Also, the payoffs of the predicted-return-based momentum strategy exhibit a strong seasonality throughout various periods. Interestingly, the strategy based on one part of the predicted returns δ z does not deliver any significant payoffs at all.
The above evidences point to the predicted return as the source of the momentum profits. However, as the predicted return contains both a predicted stock-specific component and a predicted common-factor-related risk premium component (see equation (5)), we still do not know which component is more important in explaining momentum profits. We will revisit these results in Subsection 5.3.
Model B:
Fama-French Regression (Grundy and Martin (2001)) Table 4 reports the results of Model B or the Fama-French regression. The momentum strategy based on rankings of the Fama-French factor component β F does not generate any significant payoffs for any period. In contrast, the momentum strategy based on rankings of the stock-specific component α 0 generates larger and more statistically significant payoffs than the strategy based on the raw excess returns. Since the intercept α i0 can be interpreted as the total return adjusted for rewards to the Fama-French factor exposures, the results suggest that the Fama-French model can explain the variation of winer or loser returns but cannot explain their mean returns (Grundy and Martin, 2001 ). This also confirms Grundy and Martin's findings that the momentum strategy based on the past stock-specific return components is more profitable than the strategy based on the past total returns and that the cross-sectional difference in the Fama-French factor exposures cannot explain the momentum profitability. Instead, the results from this model suggest that momentum profits mainly reflect the cross-sectional difference and momentum in the stock-specific component of returns.
The results from Model A and Model B seem to contradict each other given the well-documented predictability of the Fama-French factor risk premiums by these lagged macroeconomic variables [e.g., Campbell and Shiller (1988) , French (1988, 1989) , and Keim and Stambaugh (1986) Table 5 exhibits the payoffs of the momentum strategy based on rankings of various components of this model.
Like Model B, the strategy based on rankings of the common-factor component β F does not generate significant payoffs for all periods. Interestingly, the strategy based on rankings of either α 0 or α 0 + ε does not generate significant payoffs, either. In contrast, the strategy based on the time-varying alpha α 0 + γ z does generate significant payoffs in magnitudes comparable to the payoffs from the momentum strategy based on rankings of raw excess returns r. Specifically, the average monthly returns on the time-varyingalpha-based momentum strategy (t−statistics in parentheses) are 0.66% Although the Fama-French three-factors model is good at explaining the cross-sectional difference in expected returns, it fails to capture important cross-sectional differences related to momentum profits that are in turn related to the loadings on predictive variables as first documented in Ferson and Harvey (1999) . This observation helps illustrate why the FamaFrench component can not explain momentum profits but the predictive returns can.
Model D: Fama-French Regression with Time-Varying Risk Premium
Model D is a special case of Model B when time-varying Fama-French factor risk premiums are explicitly modeled as linear functions of the lagged macroeconomic variables. These (ex-ante) time-varying risk premiums can be calculated from either the in-sample oneperiod-ahead or the out-of-sample one-period-ahead predictive regressions with parameters estimated using the data over the estimation period. Results of Model D with the in-sampleestimated risk premiums and the out-of-sample-estimated risk premiums are reported in Table 6 and Table 7 , respectively. Table 6 Panel A reports the results of Model D using the in-sample-estimated risk premiums F . The momentum strategy based on rankings of the common-factor component β F generates no significant payoffs in any of the four periods. The payoffs of such momentum strategy are insignificantly different from zero in either the non-January months or Januaries. In contrast, the momentum strategy based on rankings of the stock-specific component r − β F delivers statistically significant payoffs for the full sample and the two post-1964 subperiods. The average monthly payoffs of the stock-specific-component-based momentum strategy are 0.50%, 0.90%, and 0.82% for the 02/1930-12/2002 period, the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod, and the 01/1990-12/2002 subperiod, respectively. The magnitude is very close to the corresponding average momentum payoffs based on the raw excess returns, which are 0.64%, 1.05%, and 0.90% per month, respectively. Moreover, the stock-specific-componentbased momentum strategy produces a similar seasonality: the payoffs are significantly positive in non-January months but significantly negative in Januaries. Table 7 Panel A displays the results of Model D using the out-of-sample-estimated timevarying risk premiums F . The momentum strategy based on rankings of the commonfactor component β F now generates marginally significant payoffs in the 01/1965-12/1989 period, which is 0.59% per month with t−statistics 1.98. For the full sample, the average payoff is 0.38% and is close to being significant (t−statistics is 1.83). The payoffs are insignificant in the pre-1965 and post-1989 subperiods. The momentum strategy based on rankings of the stock-specific component r − β F delivers higher and more significant payoffs than the momentum strategy based on rankings of the common-factor component, particulary in the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod. The average monthly payoffs are (t-statistics in parentheses) 0.42% (1.87) and 0.82% (3.27) for the full sample and the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod, respectively. The payoffs are statistically insignificant in the other two subperiods. Furthermore, the common-factor-component-based momentum payoffs do not exhibit seasonality but the stock-specific-component-based momentum payoffs shows a striking seasonality, a pattern shared by the raw-return-based momentum payoffs.
The results from Table 6 and Table 7 seem to demonstrate that the stock-specific component is one important source of the momentum profits. There are mixed evidences on whether the time-varying premium is another source of the momentum profits, though. Table 7 provides only very weak evidence to support the time-varying risk premium as another source while Table 6 offers quite strong evidences against the time-varying risk premium as another source.
Note that Model D can also be regarded as a special case of equation (8) by treating the Fama-French three-factors model as the true linear asset pricing model. The results of Model D imply that the time-varying risk premium story suggested by Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) may no longer be robustly valid once the cross-sectional restrictions are imposed on the coefficients on predictive variables. Of course, this conclusion depends on the assumption that the Fama-French three-factors model is the correct asset pricing model. More on the factor models are discussed in Section 5. Certainly, if we have imposed the wrong cross-sectional restrictions here, Chordia and Shivakumar's conclusions may still hold.
The Sources of Momentum Profits:
Common-Factor Component or Stock-Specific Component?
The empirical results so far offer strong support for the stock-specific component as the main source of momentum profits and only weak support for the common-factor component as another source. However, these results depend on the validity of the Fama-French model being the correct asset pricing model. To better understand Chordia and Shivakuma's (2002) results and identify the sources of momentum profits without making a stand on a particular asset pricing model, we use equation (5) and consider the same predictive regression as Chordia and Shivakumar except that we allow for different intercepts between the information period and the out-of-formation period. As we have argued in Section 2.1, given the assumptions of a linear asset pricing model and a linear relationship between the risk premiums and the conditioning information, the intercept in the predictive regression consists of both a stock-specific component and a common-factor component, but the difference between the in-formation-period intercept c 0 and the out-of-formation-period intercept c 1 contains only the stock-specific component (see equation (6)). If the common-factor component is the only source of momentum profits, then the two momentum strategies based on rankings of the two predicted returns c 0 + δ z and c 1 + δ z are expected to deliver similar results. On the other hand, if the stock-specific component is also the source of momentum profits, the momentum strategy based on rankings of c 0 − c 1 is expected to generate significant momentum profits. Table 3 offers some evidences on these two conjectures. First, the average monthly payoffs of the momentum strategy based on the predicted returns c 0 + δ z are 0.78% in the full sample period, 1.00% in the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod, and 0.94% in the post-1989 subperiod, respectively, and all are statistically significant. In contrast, the average monthly payoffs of the momentum strategy based on the predicted returns c 1 + δ z are insignificantly different from zero in all the corresponding periods. This finding suggest that the commonfactor component couldn't be the main source of the momentum profits. Second, the average monthly payoffs of the momentum strategy based on rankings of c 0 − c 1 are (with t-statistics in parentheses) 0.41% (2.83) in the full sample period, 0.56% (3.63) in the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod, and 0.84% (3.34) in the post-1989 subperiod, respectively. For comparison the corresponding momentum payoffs of the raw-return-based strategy are 0.64%, 1.05%, and 0.90%. Clearly, the payoffs of the strategy based on rankings of c 0 − c 1 , which contains the stock-specific information only, are significant and they account for over 50% of the momentum profits from either the raw-return-based strategy or the predicted-return-based strategy. Moreover, the payoffs of the strategy based on rankings of c 0 − c 1 exhibit some seasonality, a pattern shared by the raw-return-based strategy and the predicted-returnbased strategy. That is, the momentum payoffs are significantly positive in non-January months and negative, though not significant, in Januaries. These observations suggest that more than half of the explaining power of the predicted returns as the source of momentum profits comes from the stock-specific component contained in the predicted returns.
The results of Model C provide further evidences on the above observations (see Table 5 ). As shown in Section 4.3, the time-varying alpha (α 0 + γ z) is the source of momentum profits. Since it is closely related to the common macroeconomic variables, some might argue that this commonality in individual stock returns favors a risk-based explanation of the momentum phenomenon, and hence we just need to find out the responsible non-FamaFrench factors to proxy for such underlying risks. However, it should be cautioned that the commonality in stock-specific components is also consistent with a behavioral argument. For example, this commonality could be primarily driven by investors' (mis)interpretations of the macroeconomic shocks. Moreover, even if the commonality reflects some (unknown) macro risks, the term (α 0 + γ z) − (α 1 + γ z)=α 0 − α 1 should only contain the stock-specific information or the information not related to the common macro-factors. 13 The average monthly momentum payoffs based on rankings of this stock-specific component α 0 − α 1 are 0.46% in the full sample period, 0.56% in the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod, and 0.79% in the more recent post-1989 subperiod, respectively, and all are statistically significant. These payoffs represent over half of the payoffs of the raw-return-based momentum strategy in the corresponding periods. Such evidences substantiate the claim that the stock-specific information is one important source, if not the only source, of momentum profits.
Discussions
Time-Varying Risk
It is well documented in the literature that the risk is varying over time (e.g., Harvey, 1989; and Ferson and Harvey, 1991) and hence an asset pricing model with time-varying-beta is advocated to capture time-varying risks. We address here the concern whether our above analysis is sensitive to incorporating of time-varying risks into the models. Table 8 reports the results of the time-varying-beta counterpart to Model B. Like the constant Fama-French three-factors model in Table 4 , the momentum strategy based on rankings of the common-factor component β F + θ zF does not generate any significant payoffs across the four periods, and the momentum strategy based on rankings of the stockspecific component α 0 generates significantly positive payoffs. Interestingly, for the stockspecific-component-based momentum strategy the profits in Table 8 are significantly smaller than the corresponding-period momentum profits in Table 4 ; the same pattern occurs for the payoffs of the common-factor-based momentum strategy. This evidence seems to be consistent with Ghysels (1998) who reports that the pricing errors with constant traditional beta models are smaller than with time-varying beta models. If the beta risks are inherently misspecified, we are likely to commit larger pricing errors with a time-varying beta model than with a constant beta model so that the popular methods of modelling time-varying risks do not necessarily lead to improvements over the constant risk models.
The results of the time-varying-beta counterpart to Model C are displayed in Table 9 . Similar to the constant-beta model in Table 5 , the strategy based on rankings of the commonfactor component β F + θ zF does not generate significant payoffs in either period; the strategy based on rankings of the time-varying alpha α 0 + γ z generates significant payoffs with average monthly payoffs (and t−statistics) as follows: 0.48% (Ferson and Harvey, 1999) . For every period, the average momentum payoffs of the time-varying-alpha-based strategy are smaller in the timevarying-beta model than in the constant-beta model, again consistent with the findings of Ghysels (1998). Table 9 shows that the average monthly momentum payoffs (and t−statistics) based on rankings of the stock-specific component α 0 − α 1 are 0.39% (5.11) in the full sample period, 0.50% (4.92) in the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod, and 0.61% (3.46) in the more recent post-1989 subperiod, respectively. These payoffs represent over half of the payoffs of the raw-return-based momentum strategy in the corresponding periods. Table 6 Panel B and Table 7 Panel B present the results of the time-varying-risk versions of Model D when the in-sample and the out-of-sample one-period-ahead predicted risk premiums are used, respectively. In either of the two panels, the strategy based on rankings of the common-factor component β F + θ z F does not generate significant payoffs for any periods; in contrast, the strategy based on rankings of the stock-specific component r−β F −θ z F delivers more than half of the momentum profits of the raw-excess-return-based momentum strategy and they are significant and exhibit seasonality.
In summary, incorporating the time-varying risk into our models does not change our conclusions. That is, the stock-specific component, not the common-factor component, appears to be the main source of momentum profits. The stock-specific component always generates significant momentum payoffs while only in few occasions does the common-factor component generate marginally significant momentum payoffs.
Liquidity Factor
Some of our above discussions are based on the assumption that the Fama-French threefactors model is the true asset pricing model. It's natural to ask the question: What if the Fama-French model is not the true asset pricing model?
Recently, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) show that the market-wide liquidity is a priced state variable and that the expected stock returns are related cross-sectionally to the sensitivities of returns to the aggregate liquidity risk. They report that a liquidity risk factor accounts for half of the momentum profits over the period under study. Grinbaltt and Moskowitz (2003) note that most of the apparent momentum gains come form short positions in small, illiquid stocks.
To address this valid concern, we include the liquidity factor into our analysis and we thence have a four-factor asset pricing model.
14 Due to the data availability, the sample is truncated to the period of January 1966 through December 1999, a total of 408 months. As a result of model estimation (requiring a minimum of 36 months of data) to decompose the raw excess returns into explained and unexplained returns for portfolio formation, the 
Predictive Relationship Revisited
Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) report several key results based on the out-of-sample oneperiod-ahead predicted returns. We use the in-sample one-period-ahead predicted returns in Section 4.1. To resolve the potential differences that may be caused by the two types of predicted returns, we re-do Model A using the out-of-sample predicted returns. Specifically, for each month t, momentum portfolios are formed based on rankings of compounded outof-sample one-period-ahead predicted and unpredicted returns over the portfolio formation period {t − 7, ..., t − 2} using all NYSE/AMEX stocks on the monthly CRSP tape. The momentum strategy longs the top decile portfolio and shorts the bottom decile portfolio and holds the position for the following six months t through t + 5. For each stock in each month s in the portfolio formation period s ∈ {t − 7, ..., t − 2}, the out-of-sample one-period-ahead predicted returns and unpredicted returns are obtained with the parameters estimated using data from s − 60 through s − 1 (a minimum of 24 months of data required) based on the following model:
where r is stands for returns in excess of one-month Treasury Bill rates and z s−1 is the vector of the lagged macroeconomic variables. The sample period for the momentum profits is 08/1929-12/2002 (881 months). We differ from Chordia and Shivakumar in that we skip one month between the portfolio formation period and the portfolio investment period to reduce the bid-ask bounce effects while they do not. Table 11 presents the results with the out-of-sample one-period-ahead predictive relationship. Panel A shows that the payoffs of the momentum strategy based on rankings of the unpredicted returns, measured by either c or c + ε, are insignificantly different from zero in the full sample period and each subperiod, which is consistent with Chordia and Shivakumar's results. The payoffs of the momentum strategy based on rankings of the predicted return c + δ z generates significantly positive payoffs in the full sample period and the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod, but they are insignificant in the 08/1929-12/1964 subperiod and the post-1989 subperiod. Though significant in the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod, the predicted-return-based momentum payoffs are averaged at 0.44% per month and accounts for less than 50% of the payoff from the raw-excess-return strategy, which is 1.07% per month. The finding of almost zero profits from the predicted-return-based momentum strategy in the post-1989 subperiod is different from Chordia and Shivakumar. These two observations suggest that some of Chordia and Shivakumar's results may not be robust to the one-month skipping commonly employed to take account of microstructure concerns (see also Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed, 2003; and Griffin, Ji, and Martin, 2003).
We also examine one variation of the predictive regression by imposing the zero-intercept restriction in equation (13) so that the fitted term δ z is the so-called "Best Proportional Predictor (BPP)". 15 The estimation of such a restricted model is biased but consistent (Goldberger 1997, pp.57&148). The BPP or the predicted return does not contain the stock-specific component and it explicitly captures the co-movement between individual stock returns and the macroeconomic variables, while the residual ε contains only the stock-specific information, although the restricted predictive relationship is lack of an assetpricing-model interpretation. Panel B shows that the residual-based momentum strategy produces significantly positive payoffs of 0.61% and 0.82% per month in the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod and the post-1989 subperiod, respectively, and the payoffs display a clear pattern of seasonality. In contrast, the BPP-based momentum strategy produces only marginally significant payoffs of 0.38% in the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod, and insignificantly negative payoffs in the post-1989 subperiod, respectively. Again the evidences using the BPPtype predictive regression support the stock-specific component as the main source of the momentum profits. 16 
Other Horizons for Portfolio Formation
The in-formation-period and out-of-formation-period predictive intercepts c 0 and c 1 in the predictive framework (equation (8)) are defined based on the ranking-period horizon. A sixmonth horizon is used in the above analysis for portfolio formation to classify individual stocks into decile portfolios for the momentum strategy. We show that the difference of the two predictive intercepts c 0 − c 1 contains only the stock-specific component and the momentum strategy based solely on this stock-specific component generates significant momentum profits. In this subsection we examine whether the above results are sensitive to the different choices of ranking-period horizons.
Momentum profits arise in the short to intermediate horizon, which typically refers to 3-to 12-month ranking periods (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993). Table 12 presents the profits of the momentum strategies based on the raw excess returns r, the two predicted returns c 0 + δ z and c 1 + δ z, and the stock-specific component c 0 − c 1 with ranking horizons of 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, and 12 months, respectively. Interestingly, over the full sample period, except for the strategy based on c 1 + δ z, the profits of all other momentum strategies (and the corresponding t-statistics) increase steadily as the ranking horizon increases up to the 9-month horizon and then decline as the horizon extends to 12 months. This pattern also holds for the three subperiods, in particular for the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod.
Except for the 3-and 4-month horizons, the momentum profits based on the two predicted returns c 0 + δ z and c 1 + δ z behave quite differently. The momentum strategy based on c 0 + δ z generates significantly positive profits for the whole sample and the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod, and the profits are positive though not strongly significant for the other two subperiods. In contrast, the momentum strategy based on c 1 + δ z generates insignificant profits in the full sample and all the three subperiods, and they tend to be negative for horizons longer than 5 months. These observations suggest that some stockspecific component drives such differences.
A more direct evidence comes from the payoffs of the momentum strategy based on the c 0 − c 1 term. For horizons longer than 5 months, the momentum strategy based on the stock-specific component c 0 − c 1 delivers positive and strongly significant profits in the full sample and the two post-1964 subperiods. In the full sample, such profits are 0.603% (9-month horizon), 0.600% (11-month horizon), and 0.462% (12-month horizon), and the corresponding raw-return-based momentum profits are 0.705%, 0.583%, and 0.436%, respectively. In the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod, such profits are 0.792% (9-month horizon), 0.821% (11-month horizon), and 0.728% (12-month horizon), and the corresponding rawreturn-based momentum profits are 1.119%, 1.055%, and 0.981%, respectively. In the post-1989 subperiod, the stock-specific-component-based profits are respectively 1.148% (9-month horizon), 0.988% (11-month horizon), and 0.752% (12-month horizon), and all are strongly significant; the corresponding raw-return-based profits are 0.977%, 0.737%, and 0.521%, respectively, and they are statistically insignificant. For the 5-month horizon, the momentum strategy based on the c 0 − c 1 term generates significantly positive profits, about half of the magnitude of the raw-return-based momentum profits, in the two post-1964 subperiods and positive but insignificant profits in the full sample. For horizons smaller than 5 months, though the momentum strategy based on the c 0 −c 1 term does not generate significant profits in some of the periods, it still produces significant and positive profits in the 01/1965-12/1989 subperiod.
Conclusions
We examine in this paper the sources of momentum profits in terms of the stock return's common-factor component versus its stock-specific component. Using a model nesting both Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) and Grundy and Martin (2001), we first confirm their results. That is, as in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) the expected returns predicted by a set of lagged common macroeconomic variables seem to be the main source of momentum profits in stock returns; yet as in Grundy and Martin (2001) the stock-specific component but not the common-factor component of stock returns explains the momentum profits in the framework of the Fama-French three-factors model with either constant or time-varying betas. We then reconcile these two seemingly "contradictory" evidences by showing that the Fama-French three-factors model leaves out important predictive variations in stock returns responsible for Chordia and Shivakumar's (2002) results. We further impose on the coefficients of predictive regressions the cross-sectional restrictions implied by the Fama-French three-factors model. We show that the bulk of the predictive variations needed for explaining the momentum profits appears to mainly come from the stock-specific component rather than the (predicted) common-factor component.
In the context of a linear asset pricing model with any choice of factors and by nesting the predictive regression as a reduced form of such model, we show that the predictive intercept and hence the predicted returns contain both a stock-specific component and a common-factor component. We propose a method, which is free from the missing-factor problem in specifying the asset pricing model, to extract the stock-specific component from the predictive intercept. The momentum strategy based solely on this stock-specific component generates significant payoffs accounting for more than half of the momentum profits in stock returns. Even though Ferson and Harvey (1991) demonstrate that the timevarying risk premiums are mainly responsible for the return predictability, which in turn seems to explain the momentum profits, we show that the bulk of the predictive variations needed for explaining the momentum profits are nevertheless driven by the predicted stockspecific component. For robustness, we include both the time-varying risk and Pastor and Stambaugh's (2003) liquidity factor, on top of the Fama-French three factors, into the asset pricing model; we examine variants of the predictive relation; and we explore various horizons for portfolio formation. In almost all set-ups, we get very similar results on the significance of the profits from the momentum strategy based on rankings of this stock-specific component.
Our empirical results on the sources of momentum profits carry implications for modelling the momentum phenomenon in theory. The stock-specific component, if not the only source, appears to be a very important source. In various models and setups it always generates significant momentum profits in magnitude of over half of the momentum profits in stock returns. The common-factor component, i.e., the time-varying risk premiums but not the time-varying risks, may be another source but the empirical support is very weak. Similar to Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) we find a striking commonality in individual stock returns in response to the macroeconomic shocks. The commonality explains a large proportion of the total momentum profits and hence warrants a further study.
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The dividend yield (DIV) is defined as the total dividend payment accrued to the CRSP value-weighted market index over the past 12 months divided by the current price level of the index. The term premium (TERM) is the yield spread of a ten-year Treasury bond and a three-month Treasury bill, the default premium (DEF) is the yield spread of Moody's Baa and Aaa rated bonds, and the short rate (YLD) is the yield on the three-month Treasury bill. MARKET This table reports the monthly returns in percentage for momentum portfolios formed based on past six-month returns and held for the following six months. For each month t, all NYSE/AMEX stocks on the monthly CRSP tape with returns for months t − 7 through t − 2 are ranked into decile portfolios according to their compounded returns during that period. Decile portfolios are formed monthly by weighting equally all firms in that decile ranking. P 1 and P 10 are the equal-weighted portfolios of the 10 percent of the stocks with the lowest and the highest returns over the pervious six months, respectively. The momentum strategy longs the winner portfolio (P10) and shorts the loser (P1) and holds the positions for the following six months t through t + 5. t− statistics are reported in parentheses. The row titled "% > 0"gives the percentage of P 10 − P 1 that are positive. Overall Non-Jan Jan
Overall Non-Jan Jan
Overall Non-Jan 
where r t stands for returns in excess of one-month Treasury Bill rates, D This table reports the monthly returns in percentage of the alternative momentum strategies. For each month t, the following model is estimated for each NYSE/AMEX stock on the monthly CRSP tape using data from t − 61 through t − 2 (a minimum of 36 months of data required):
where r t stands for returns in excess of one-month Treasury Bill rates, D τ is the dummy variable with D τ =1 for τ ∈ {t − 7, ..., t − 2} and Table 5 : Profits (= P 10 − P 1) of Alternative Momentum Strategies: Model C
For each month t, the following model is estimated for each NYSE/AMEX stock on the monthly CRSP tape using data from t − 61 through t − 2 (a minimum of 36 months of data required):
Descriptions of variables, momentum strategies and momentum profits are the same as in Table 3 . This table reports the monthly returns in percentage of the alternative momentum strategies with predicted risk premium computed in-sample. For each month t, the following model is estimated for each NYSE/AMEX stock on the monthly CRSP tape using data from t − 61 through t − 2 (a minimum of 36 months of data required):
where r t stands for returns in excess of one-month Treasury Bill rates, D τ is the dummy variable with D τ =1 for τ ∈ {t − 7, ..., t − 2}
and D τ =0 otherwise, z t−1 is the vector of the lagged macroeconomic variables and F t the vector of Fama-French factors. The in-sample one-period-ahead predicted value F t for the period of t − 61 through t − 2 is obtained from the following model (a minimum of 36 months of data required):
Using the estimated betas and F t , factor-and non-factor-related returns for the period of months t − 7 through t − 2 are calculated and compounded accordingly. Each strategy designates winners and losers as the top and bottom deciles according to the compounded returns during the period of months t − 7 through t − 2. Portfolios are formed monthly. The momentum strategy longs the winner portfolio (P10) and shorts the loser (P1) and holds the positions for the following six months. t− statistics are reported in parentheses. following model is used to estimate betas for each NYSE/AMEX stock on the monthly CRSP tape using data from t − 61 through t − 2 (a minimum of 36 months of data required):
and D τ =0 otherwise. Using the estimated betas and F t , factor-and non-factor-related returns for the period of months t − 7 through t − 2 are calculated and accordingly compounded. Each strategy designates winners and losers as the top and bottom deciles according to the compounded returns during the period of months t − 7 through t − 2. Portfolios are formed monthly. Only stocks with returns throughout the entire ranking period are eligible for winner/loser selection. The momentum strategy longs the winner portfolio (P10) and shorts the loser (P1) and holds the positions for the following six months. For each month t, the following model is estimated for each NYSE/AMEX stock on the monthly CRSP tape using data from t − 61 through t − 2 (a minimum of 36 months of data required):
where r t stands for returns in excess of one-month Treasury Bill rates, D Ranking Based on Overall Non-Jan Jan
Overall Non-Jan Jan For each month t, the following model is estimated for each NYSE/AMEX stock on the monthly CRSP tape using data from t − 61 through t − 2 (a minimum of 36 months of data required):
Overall Non-Jan Jan To be continued. This table reports the monthly returns in percentage of the alternative momentum strategies for a four-factor extension of Model B. For each month t, the following model is estimated for each NYSE/AMEX stock on the monthly CRSP tape using data from t − 61 through t − 2 (a minimum of 36 months of data required):
where GF t is the vector of the three Fama-French factors and the liquidity factor. Descriptions of other variables, momentum strategies and momentum profits are the same as in This table reports the monthly returns in percentage of the alternative momentum strategies with predicted returns computed out-ofsample. For each month t, all NYSE/AMEX stocks on the monthly CRSP tape are ranked into decile portfolios according to different components compounded over the formation period of months t − 7 through t − 2. For each stock in each month s in the formation period s ∈ {t−7, ..., t−2}, each component is obtained from the following one-period-ahead out-of-sample prediction with the parameters estimated using data from s − 60 through s − 1 (a minimum of 24 months of data required): Ranking Based on Overall Non-Jan Jan
Overall Non-Jan Jan 
